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DOGMATISM AND DECISION-MAKING IN A
VARIABLE RISK SITUATION
Previous studies in the literature concerning decision-making
place much emphasis upon the use cf economic, mathematical and
logico-deductive models in describing and explaining how decisions
are made.

Very seldom, however, have investigators undertaken to

consider decision-making as a process at least partially dependent
upon personality correlates.

The few studi.es reported in this area

have explored such personality cor�elates as the cautious versus the
risky personality or the confident versus the doubtful person with
respect to differences in decision-making.
One study conducted by Mos_teller and Nogee (1955) examined
risk-taking behavior with tw groups, one comprised of National
Guardsmen and the other consisting of Harvard undergraduates.

The

investigators found that, relative to high and low payoff with dice
and play money, the students bet odds which presumably �uld return
payoffs proportional to the risk involved.

It was suggested that

the middle class value system, which places a premium on success,
led students to make choices which returned an amount of money
commensurate with the risk involved.
Another study on risk-taking behavior, this one undertaken by
Scodel, Ratoosh, and Minas (1959), investigated risk-taking behavior
among Harvard undergraduates and U.S. Air Force persoMel.

Using

a probability system with dice incorporating a high and low payoff,
l
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it was found that strength of need achievement was directly related
to the selection of high-probability, low payoff alternatives.

More

low payoff choices were selected by high need-achievers, while low
need-achievers selected high payoffs.
Stone (1964), using four measures for examining expected return
on bets in a risk-taking situation, found neither scholastic
performance nor intelligence to be related to high-probability,
low-payoff criteria.

He did, however, find a moderately high positive

correlation between acquiescence and selection of high-probability,
low-payoff bets.

Stone concluded that the variance in response between

high and low-payoff subjects could be more fully understood through an
examination of personality rather than intellectual capacity factors.
Vroom (1959) investigated the relationship between decision
making and participation as a function of high and low authoritarian
personality traits.

In his study he endeavored to determine how

authoritarian individuals functioned in a group decision-making
situation.

Specifically, the study was aimed at discovering how

certain personality characteristics interact with democratic
leadership styles.

In dealing with high and low authoritarian

personalities, he found that the attitudes of those scoring low in
authoritarianism perpetuated favorable group interactions under
decision-making circumstances.

The positive or negative effects of

authoritarianism on the group were measured by the number of suggestions
given by the subjects and by their ability to accept the ideas of
other individuals in the group.

The high authoritarians, on the other

hand, did not accept the ideas of others in the group nor did they

contribute to the decision of the whole group as readily as the
low authoritarians.
McClellend (1956), in a study with young children, explored
the relationship between risk-taking behavior and need-achievement.
He found that those with high need-achievement tended to select
alternatives which were in an intennediate range of probability of
success.

The children that McClellend differentiated as low

need-achievers made choices which were either highly ,probable of
success or highly probable of failure.

McClellend postulated that

this discrepancy was partially due to a fear of failure among the
children who were low need-achievers.
Relationships between need-achievement and degrees of risk-taking
were also studied bY. Atkinson, Bastian, Earl, and Litwin (1960).
It was suggested by them that risk-taking was more likely to occur
when risks involved the use of skill than when skill was not necessary
in the betting situation.

Littig (1962) concluded that a

skill-oriented group was more often willing to take chances by
making bets involving lower probabilities of winning than was a
non-skill oriented group.
Block and Petersen (1955) investigated the relevance of certain
personality variables to the amount of confidence displayed by
subjects in making decisions.

Subjects who were overly confident,

as measured by their certainty in reporting differences in the length
of two lines, were found to require a long time in making decisions.
Block and Petersen also found a third group whose speed of decision
making was predicated upon the discernability of differences in the
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perceptual situation.
Examining the decision-making characteristics of the group,
Rim (1964) reported that group decisions appeared to be more risky
than individual decisions in that the former chose decisions which
entailed a greater gamble.

Using Eysenck's Short questionnaire For

the Measurement of Two Dimensions of Personality, Rim found that
subjects scoring high on the Extroversion Scale tended to take
more chances than those scoring high on the Neuroticism Scale,
Accident rates and personality factors were found to be
correlated with high and low risk-taking by Conger, Gaskill, Glad,
Rainey, Sawrey, and Turrell (1959).

The results indicated that those

subjects taking moderate risks in a game situation also tended to
take either moderate or low risks when driving an automobile.
It was the specific aim of this investigation to explore the
possible presence of differential decision-making tendencies in high
and low dogmatic· individuals in a situation involving risk.

The

definition for dogmatism which was used is taken from The Open and
Closed Mind, by Rokeach (1960).

Basically, Rokeach defines the highly

dogmatic personality as involving a closed �gnitive system; the low
dogmatic personality is characterized by an open cognitive systemo
More particularly, he stated that:
Dogmatism means a relatively closed cognitive organization
of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, organized around
a central set of beliefs about absolute authority which, in
turn, provides a framewrk for patterns of intolerance and
qualified tolerance toward others (p. 58)o
The central focus, then, of this study 1s the acquisition of
information which may allow a better understanding of the possible

s
link between particular personality correlates and decision-making
under risk situations.
A hypothesis to be tested in this investigation is that the
high dogmatic person will tend to choose alternatives in a
risk-taking situation which have either extremely high or low
probabilities of payoff.

The low dogmatic individual, on the other

hand, will choose alternatives which are in the intermediate range of
payoff probability.
It is also hypothesized that the low dogmatic or flexible
individual will tend to shift more frequently to different odds
from trial to trial while the high dogmatic or rigid personality
will tend to more often make the same bet over successive tTials.

METHOD
Subjects
The ,2s used in the study were 26 male and 24 female
undergraduate studeqts enrolled in a General Psychology class at
Western Michigan University.

The mean age of this group was

20.4 years.
Measures of Personality Variables
Dogmatism
The Rokeach Dogmatism <;uestionnaire (D scale) was
used.

It has a reported reliability of .91 (Rokeach, 1961).

Content areas included were:

over identification with a cause,

time perspective, punitiveness toward ideological renegade.
martyrdom, refusal "t.� compromise ideologically, identification
with the intellectually elite, egocentrism• and self-righteousness
(see Appendix-B for the entire scale).
A typical item from the Rokeach Scale is as follows:
While I don't like to .admit this even to myself
rrry great ambition is to become a great man like
Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
The method of scoring followed the system developed by Rokeach
(1961). Only positive and negative scale values were utilized;
i.e., each question assessed either agreement or disagreemente
The values ranged from a +3 to a .3 as follows&
6
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+3:

I

agree fully

+2:

I

agree on the whole

+l:

I

agree a little

-1:

I disagree a little

-2:

I disagree on the whole

-3:

I disagree fully

Total adjusted scores were obtained by adding a constant of
+4 to each answer in order to eliminate negative scores.

The

following written instru.ctions preceded the Rokeach Dogmatism Scales
The following is a study of what the public feels about
a number of important social and personal questions. The
best answer to each question below is your own personal
opinion, therefore a wide variation is to be expected.
Many different and opposing points of view are covered in
this questionnaire; you may find yourself agreeing strongly
'With some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly
with others; whether you agree or disagree with any
statement you can be sure that many people feel the same
as you do.
Need Achievement
A total of-29 items from The Edwards Personal Preference
Inventory (1959) were used in order to obtain a measure of the
strength of the need for achievement.

The items from the E.P.P.I.

also served to disguise the meaning of items from the Rokeach D
scale.
The instructions for the questions from the E.P.P.I. were
as follows:
Included in this questionnaire you will find some
statements about things you may or may not like; about
ways you may or may not feel. Please look at the
example below.
A. I like to talk about myself to others.
B. I like to work toward some goal I have set for myself.

Ss were to select the statement from each pair which was most
characteristic of their preferences.
For the complete set of need-achievement items see the Edwards
Personal Preference Schedule, the Psychological Corporation, New York,
1959.
Formation of. Experimental Groups
The 25 ,2s with the highest scores (high dogmatism) and the 25 ,2s
,
with the lowest scores (low dogmatism), derived from the Rokeach
D Scale, were selected from an initial group of 107 students enrolled

in General Psychology at Western Michigan University.

For a

comparison of the D scale scores for high and low dogmatism groups,
see Table 1.

These experimental groups were then evaluated for

equivalency on the basis of scores obtained from the Edwards Personal
Preference Schedule (see Table 2).

The two groups were found not to

differ from each other in terms of this measure of the strength of
the need for achievement.

The individual scores on both scales for

each group may be found in Appendix A.
The Task
Using play money and a chart of probabilities, (see Fig. 1), the
Ss threw dice and placed bets for 20 successive trials.

The Ss were

given complete freedom to select each bet based upon their preference.
The only restriction was that a fixed amount of 30¢ could be bet each
trial.

While the .2s were looking at the probability table, the

following instructions were verbally given by E:
This is th� second part of the research study in which
you volunteered to participate.
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TABLE 1

CCMPARISON OF D SCALE SCORES FOR
HIGH AND LOW DOGMATISM GROUPS

N

MEAN

s

High
Dogmatic

25

285.88

20.4

4.08

Low
Dogmatic

25

197.60

14. 7'

2.94

GROUPS

SE

df

t

p

48

4.41

<.01

10

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF NEED-ACHIEVEMENT SCORES FOR
HIGH AND LOW DOGMATISM GROUPS

GROUPS
High

N

MEAN

s

SE

Dogmatic

25

12.80

4.13

.826

Low
Dogmatic

25

13.16

4.19

.838

df

t

48

.063

p

).OS
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LETTERS
Winning
Numbers

Chances

Payoff

A

B

2,3, 5,6,
4,S, 7,8,
6,7, 9
10,11,
12

3-4

2-3

C

0

2,4, 8,9,
6,8, 10
10,12

1-2

1-3

E

F

G

H

I

5,6

7

9

3

12

1-4

l-6

1-9

1-18

.10

.15

.30

.60

.90 $1.50

A

B

C

0

E

F

1-36

$2.40 $5.10 $10.80

G

H

Figure l. Risk taking chart used by subjects in dice-throwing.

I

Please look at this table (Fig. 1). You will notice
that there are various probabilities listed which accompany
potential winning numbers. These numbers are possible totals
which occur when two dice are thrown. For example, the
chances are 1 in 6 of getting a 7 when two dice are thrown
(please look in column F). The reason for the l in 6
probability is that there are 36 possible combinations in
throwing two dice and 6 which could total 7. Are there any
questions?
I will give you six dollars of play money to start with
and each bet will be for 30� of the play money I give you.
Please place your money on the letter which you wish to bet
each time. You will get 20 throws. You are in competition
with the rest of the students also involved in this part of
the study. There will be several winners who will win some
real money. I wi 11 let you know at the end of the study who
the real winners were.
The winners will be determined by how much money is
accumulated after 20 throws.
Each response of the

1 was
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re�orded on a sheet duplicating the

betting chart with the letters A through I printed on it.

For

example, if D was first chosen, representing a bet on the numbers
8, 9, or 10 with the odds of 1 to 3, a "1" was placed in column D
on the �•s chart.

The winnings were given to each

away following each trial.

1 or

losses taken

The E then marked the number "2" in the

column following the letter chosen next by the subject.

If the

subject was successful in a throw, the number was circled by!•
The responses were then totaled for each individual under each betting
category chosen.
From the data thus obtained, rigidity and variability of betting
behavior was measured.

Response rigidity was calculated by totaling

the number of times each response was repeated on the next triale
Responses which deviated from the immediately preceding response were
designated as variable responses.

The direction of response variability

was examined by totaling the number of times a subject chose either
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higher or lower odds following failure of a betting response.
Response variability following successful (winning) betting was
also examined.

RESULTS
In Table 3 are.shown the empirically obtained distributions
of betting responses made for each ,of the nine betting categories
by the high and low dogmatism groups.

These data are graphically

depicted in Figure 2.
The chi square statistic was utilized in testing the obtained
distributions of betting odds selections for each probability level
to ascertain whether or not the differences in frequency could be
attributed to chance.
of these tests.

Table 3 also shows a summary of the results

The theoretical frequencies for each group for BJlY

particular set of odds were derived from an assumption of equal
distribution of responses.
For winning odds of .667 (X2
df

a

a

8.58, df = 1), .500 (X2 • 19.44,

1), .110 (X2 • 13.50, df • 1), and .O?S (X2 • 15.68, df • 1),

the two groups were found to di ffer from one another in terms of the
frequency with which bets were placed in those particular categories.
These differences departed from chance, being significant at the
.01 level of confidence.
Additionally, the two groups differed from each other in the
frequency with which bets were placed where the odds were
one-in-eighteen.
confidence (X2

_a

This was. significant at the .0 2 level of
6.32, df • 1).

It can be seen that the high dogmatism group placed a larger
number of bets in the .667 and .500 categories than did the low
14
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TABLE 3
CCl1PARISONS OF RISK-TAKING RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS
FOR HIGH AND LOW DOGiATis-1 GROUPS
Betting
Categories

A

Probability 3-48

High

Dogmatic

·. Low
Dogmatic
Chi

C

D

E

F

G

2-3

1-2

1-3

1-4

1-6

1-9

1-18

66

38

30

ab

65

44

66

19b

31b

161

136

17

11

91

144

0.03

S9_:!are

B

8.58**19.44�' 0.23

'

0.01

H

23

*
,{r{(

Yate•s correction for continuity applied
P< .02
P< .01

....

1-36
11
39

0.44 13.50-lrlt 6.32* 15.68*

a 3-4 equivalent to a winning throw of the dice expected
3 times out of every 4 tosses

b

I

16
------ Low Dogmatic
___ High Dogmatic

17

160

1.50
140
130

I

120
110

I

I

100

I

90
CJl

�

80

I

70
�

&1

I

I
�
�
�
�

60
.50

\

40

I

I

1\

\
\

', ,.

JO

\

I

20
10

.750
Figure 2.

•

7 .500 .333 .250 .1 7 .110 .0.5.5 .025
PROBABILITIES OF WINNING

Number of responses at each betting category for
high and low dogmatism groups.

dogmatism group.

Conversely, the low dogmatism group made
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significantly more bets than did the high dogmatism group in the
categories where the risks were relatively large (probabilities of
winning• .110,

.ass,

.025).

When the frequencies of betting responses were examined for
the t,va groups in those instances where -Ss selected. odds of 3 out of
4, 1 out of 3, 1 out of 4, or 1 out of 6, they were found not to vary
from the distribution expected on the basis of pure chance,
(-l- • 0.03, 0.23, 0.01, respectively where df .. 1, P> .05).
Table 4 summarizes a chi square analysis made in terms of
assessing the gigntficance of the differences in frequencies of
_betting responses between high and low dogmatism i s for high,
intermediate, and low risk categories.

These categories were

arbitrarily established in the following manner:

Low Risk included

the odds of winning from .750 to .500; Intermediate Risk included
the odds of winning from .333 to .167; and the High Risk category
incorporated the probabilities of .110 to .025.
The high risk zone contained 49 or 9.8% of the total bets for the
low dogmatic group. In the low risk zone, 211 bets or 42.2% were
made by the high dogmatic individuals contrasted with 119 bets
(23.8% of the total) made by the low dogmatic group.

In the intermediate

range of probabilities were found 240 bets or 48% of the high
dogmatic 2s' total responses as compared to 253 or 50.6% of the low
dogmatic is• bets. A significant relationship was found to exist
between the number of bets placed in risk categories and dogmatism
(X2 • 61.12, df • 2, P< .01).

As reflected in Table 5, a chi square test was made to evaluate

18

TABLE 4
CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS FOR DIFFERENCES IN FREQUENCIES
OF BETTING RESPONSES IN HIGH, INTERMEDIATE,
AND LOW RISK CATEGORIES

Category
Low

Risk

Intermediate
Risk
High
Risk

Frequency of Responses
High Dog.
Low Dog.
2 11

119

240

2 53

49

128

df

2

x2

61.1 2

p

(.01
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TABLE 5
CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF REPETITIVE
BETTING BEHAVIOR FOR HIGH AND
LOW DOGMATISM GROUPS

Groups

High
Dog.
Low
Do •

Number of Repetitive Bets
0-5
6-8
9-11
3

8

df

6

p

14

2
9

x2

10

3.94

).05

the independence or association between betting behavior and standing

20

on a measure of dogmatism where no consideration was given to wins
or losses in the immediately preceding trial. This revealed that
the frequencies with which repetitive responses were made were not
associated with high or low dogmathm (X2 • 3.94, df • 2 , P).O5).
A chi square analysis of the frequencies with which variable
responses were mude can be found in Table 6.

In this case no

consideration had been given to the occurence of wins or losses in
the immediately preceding trial.

The extent to which Ss changed to

different betting odds was not found to be associated with high or
low dogmatism (X2 ra;..'�.O8, df • 2 , P "") .OS).
A more detailed analysis was undertaken in order to explore any

differences that might exist between the two experimental groups in
the direction of betting immediately subsequent to e"ither a loss or a
win.

Direction in this instance referred to a change in odds of

either a higher or lower probability, or to a bet of the same odds
as the immediately preceding trial.
When the betting behavior immediately following a loss was
examined (see Table 7), it was found that the high dogmatism group
significantly differed from the low dogmatism group in tenns of the
extent to which lower risks were selected, (X2 .. 7.86, df '=: 2 , P< .OS).
The high dogmatism group of Ss tended to more frequently choose lower
risk odds after a loss than did the low dogmatism group which tended
to less often select a lower risk bet.
An examination of those instances in which §_s repeated a bet at
the same odds as the previous trial subsequent to a loss disclosed

21

TABLE 6
CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF VARIABLE BETTING
BEHAVIOR FOR HIGH AND LOW
DOGMATI91 GROUPS

Groups

Number of Variable Bets
0-5
6-8
9-11

High
Dog.

10

Low
Do .

4

6
6

df

x2

2

4.08

p

9

15

).05
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TABLE 7
ANALYSIS OF BETTING RESPONSES FOR
HIGH AND LOW DOGMATISM GROUPS
FOLLOWING A LOSS
Number of Bets
Risk
Category

Groups

0-2

3-5

6-8

df

Risk

tower

High Dog.
Low Dog.

3
12

12

10
15

2

Same
Risk

High Dog.
Low Dog.

18
15

Higher
Risk

High Dog.
Low Dog.

18

a

10

8

7a

10

7a
15

1
1

x2

p

7.86

<.OS

.357 ).05
3.98

Due to small cell frequencies, categories were
co11 apsed to include 3-8 bets for both groups.

<.OS
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no differences in the extent to which high and low dogmatism groups
made this type of selection (X2 = 0.357, df

m

1, P ).OS).

·when the betting behavior immediately following a loss was
examined, it was found that the high dogmatism group significantly
differed from the low dogmatism group in terms of the extent to which
higher risks were selected (X2 • 3.98, df .. 1, P < .05).

The low

dogmatism group more often selected higher risk odds following a loss
than did the high dogmatism group which tended to avoid making bets
at a higher risk level after losing.
In Table 8 are found the data pertaining to an analysis of the
betting behavior t�;ing place immediately subsequent to a winning
trial.

It was determined that the high dogmatism group did

significantly differ from the low dogmatism group in the degree to
which lower risks were chosen (X2 • 6.44, df • 2, P<.05).

The high

dogmatism group more frequently selected lower risks after winning
than did the low dogmatism group.
It was found that the two groups did not differ from each other
with reference to the frequency with which bets of the same odds
as those previously made were repeated after winning (X2 • 0.11,
df

a

2,

P>.05).

When a change in direction of betting odds after a win to some
higher risk level was evaluated, it was found that the low dogmatism
group placed significantly more bets than did the high dogmatism
group, which tended to make fewer bets in a higher risk category
2
(X • 3.98, df • 1, P< .OS).
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TABLE 8
ANALYSIS OF BETTING RESPONSES FOR
HIGH AND LOW DOGMATISM GROUPS
· FOLLOWING A WIN
Number of Bets
Risk
Category

Groups

0-2

Lower
Risk

High Dog.
Low Dog.

5

Same
Risk

High Dog.
Low Dog.

9

Higher
Risk

High Dog.
Low Dog.

18

a

9

7

10

3-5

6-8

df

9

11

6

10
10

13

3

8

7a

15

x2

p

2

6.44

<.05

2

0.11

).05

1

3.98

<.OS

Due to small cell frequencies, categories were
collapsed to include 3-8 bets for both groups.

DISCUSSION
The results from this study partially supported the hypothesis
that �s scoring low on dogmatism would tend to choose a larger
number of intermediate risk bets, while �s scoring high on
dogmatism would tend to select those associated with very high or
low probability levels under variable risk conditions.

The data

indicated that the majority of bets were placed in the intermediate
risk categories by both groups.

High dogmatic �s did choose more

frequently those odds associated with the higher probabilities of
success when contrasted to the low dogmatic �s (P < .Ol). On the
other hand, the low dogmatic �s selected more often those odds
associated with the lower probabilities of success than did �s
scoring high on the dogmatism scale (P< .01, P <.02).
The selection of a relatively high number of intermediate
risk bets; i.e., risk probabilities of .333 to .500, by 2,s both
high and low in dogmatism seemed to indicate a possible tendency
on the part of many subjects, at least in this study, to seek some
kind of perceived balance between risk involved and the amount
of payoff possible.

Win probabilities of .333 and .500 had

associated with them the highest frequencies of betting responses
for both groups:

high dogmatism, 136 and 161; low dogmatism, 144

and 91, respectively.

It is 'Within this area that a combination

of likelihood of winning and payoff tend to maximize expected
return.

Above .500 risk is less, but payoff diminishes considerably;
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below .333 the chances of losing greatly increase, although
payoff is higher.
As brought out earlier, (McClellend, 1953), a fear of
experiencing failure or lack of confidence may cause 1s to choose
among alternatives in risk situations which have relatively higher
probabilities of success.

In the present study, dislike of a

possible failure experience may have led the high dogmatism 1s to
select odds with relatively high success potential.

Since the

highly dogmatic individual often believes that only his own ideas
are correct, (Rokeach, 1961), he may feel defensive when any of
these beliefs or expectancies fail to be substantiated or confirmed.
The low dogmatic person, on the other hand, may be more willing
to gamble, under certain circumstances, on lower probabilities of
success.

He can perhaps more readily accept the challenge of high

risk-taking because it may not be associated with a threat to the
maintenance of existing beliefs or expectancies.
The second hypothesis involving a comparison of repetitive
and non-repetitive responses for each group was not confirmed.
Results were not significan� at the .OS level of confidence,
although the findings did show some tendency for the high dogmatic
is to make more repetitive bets than the low dogmatic §..s in this
risk-taking situation.

The frequencies were certainly in the

expected direction if one conceptualizes dogmatism as involving a
continuum of flexibility or rigidity of behavior.
An examination of losses revealed a significant difference
between the high and low dogmatism groups with respect to the
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differential selection of lower and higher risk bets immediately
In this case, the high dogmatic group

following losing trials.

showed an inclination to more frequently switch to a lower risk
bet after having lost.

The low dogmatic 2s were more likely to

change to a bet involving a higher risk.

This was significant at

the .05 level of confidence. However, the data did not indicate
a tendency for the high dogmatic 2s to select any more frequently
than the low dogmatic �s the same set of odds on the trials
immediately following failure (P .05).
When a comparison of betting responses immediately following
winning trials was examined, it wa� found that the high dogmatic
Ss chose more often those odds associated with lesser risk-taking,
while the low dogmatic �s chose more frequently the higher-risk
bets after a win (P .05).

Again selection of bets, equal in risk

to the previous one following a win, was not associated with
differences in dogmatism between the two groups (P .05).
The data suggest that the two groups operated in a fairly
�

consistent fashion after both winning and losing.

The high dogmatic

group displayed a tendency to move toward odds with greater success
potential, while the low dogmatic group tended to move in the
direction of greater risk-taking.
A comparison of the data contained in Tables 7 and 8 revealed

a tendency for 2s in both groups to change to some other set of odds

immediately following a loss, whereas subsequent to a win, both
groups demonstrated an inclination to repeat the same bet again
(where the odds were the same) on the next trial.

It would seem t""o be of some value in the design of future
experiments of this nature to utilize failure which entails
personal loss.

In the study just completed, the subjects were

placed in a risk situation where loss was in terms of simulated
money. which had not been "earned" by them to begin with.

Also, an

examination of risk-taking behavior where winn"ing and/or losing were
systematically manipulated or held constant might be attempted in
order to exclllline more explicitly the direction and magnitude of
risk-taking following specified levels of winning and/or losing
for 2,s scoring high and low on a measure of dogmatism.
Data from this study indicated that within a sample of college
students, those scoring high on dogmatism, as compared with those
scoring low on this dimension, tended to select betting odds
suggesting a more "conservative" type of behavior in terms of
betting more often on a relatively sure thing.

In contrast, the low

dogmatism group displayed a greater willingness to "take a chance"
by placing bets associated with lower success probabilities.
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SUMMARY

This study involved an investigation of the decision-making
tendencies of 25 high dogmatic and 25 low dogmatic �s.

The

hypothesis that high dogmatic personalities would choose extreme
ends of a probability continuum and that the low dogmatic .§s would
choose the intermediate categories was partially confirmed.

High

dogmatic _§s as a group tended to make more bets associated with
odds �ere chances of success were high in comparison with the
low dogmatic group (P< .01).

In addition to the high-success choices,

the high dogmatic group selected a preponderance of the intermediate
probabi 11 ties.

The low dogmatic .§s also chose the intermediate

probability odds, but fewer of the high probability ones in
comparison with the high dogmatism .group

(P< .01, P< .02).

The second hypothesis was not supported.

The successive

repetition of choices (rigidity) did not serve as a means, in
this study, of differentiating between the high and low dogmatism
Ss.

This was not significant at the .05 level of confidence.
The direction of betting choices following failure was found to

be associated with high a.nd low dogmatism. Direction of choice
following winning a'lso was significantly associated with level
of dogmatism (P< .OS).
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Appendix A
SCORES FOR HIGH AND LOW DOGMATI� GROUPS FROM THE
ROKEACH DOGMATISM SCALE AND THE
EDWARDS PERSONAL PREFERENCE SCALE
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Low Do gma.!.!.fil!l
Subject

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Rokeach Scale

216
186
186
190
198
206
208
205
216
200
202
194
201
212
189
213
203
188
148
202
209
208
208
209
147
4944

High Dogmatism

E.P.P.I.

Subject

20
14
15
15
13
8
13
13
10
12
16
4
11
9
21
8

1
2
3

16

8
10
12
16
15
20
17
13
329

4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

.

Rokeach Scale

269
277
268
265
307
291
280
277
275
289
307
349
273
294
275
303
267
269
334
273
287
311
281
263
263
7147

E.P.P.I.
18

14
10
6
15
15
14
6
12
15
15
11
11
13
8
15
7
12
18
8

14
14
9
22
19
320

Appendix B
ITEMS USED FROM ROKEACH DOGMATI� SCALE
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1.

While I don ° t like to admit this even to myself, my
secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein,
or Beethoven, o'e Shakespeare.

2.

The highest form of government is a democracy and the
highest form of democracy is a government run by those
who are most intelligent.

3.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's
going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions
of those one respects.

4.

To compromise with our political opponents is to be
guilty of appeasement.

S.

To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous
because· it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

6.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a
w�rthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to
restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

7.

Its all too true that people just won't practice
what they preach.

8.

When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we
must be careful not to compromise with those who believe
differently than we do.

9.

It is only natural that a person would have a much
better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than
with ideas he opposes.

10.

Most of the ideas which get printed today aren't worth
the paper they are written on.

11.

If given the chance I would do something of great benefit
to the world.

12.

My hardest battles are with myself.

13.

In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat
myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

14.

There are too kinds of people in this world: those who
are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

15.

There's no use wasting your money on newspapers which
you know in advance are just plain propaganda.

16.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
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17.

It is sometimes necessary to resort to force to advance
an ideal one strongly believes in.

18.

I am afraid of people who want to find out what I'm
really like for fear they'll be disappointed.

19.

It is by returning to our glorious and forgotten
part that real social progress can be achieved.

20.

If I had to choose between happiness and greatness,
I'd choose greatness.

21.

Most people just don• t give a "damn" for others.

22.

I have often felt that strangers were looking
at me critically.

23.

The United States and Russia have just about nothing
in common.

24.

I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell
me how to solve my personal problems.

25.

If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is
sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all".

26.

In the history of mankind there have been probably
just a handful of great thinkers.

27.

If given the chance I 'tvOuld do something of great
benefit to the \vOrld.

28.

I am sure I am being talked about.

29.

Communism and Catholicism have nothing in common.

30.

There are certain "isms" which are really the same even
though those who believe in those "isms" try to tell
you they are different.

31.

A group which tolerates too much differences of

32.

Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have
discussed important social and moral problems don't
really understand what's going on.

33.

The present is too often full of unhappiness.
only the future that counts.

34.

Most people just don't know what's good for them.

opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

It is
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35.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses
to admit he's wrong.

36.

Young people should not have too easy access to books
which are likely to confuse them.

37.

A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes
is l:lkely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

38.

A man who does not believe in some great cause has
not really lived.

39.

Nost people are failures and it is the system ,;.;rhich
is responsible for this.

40.

In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish
if he considers primarily his own happiness.

41.

In times like these it is often necessary to be more
on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in
one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.

42.

Even though I have a lot of faith in the intelligence
and wisdom of the common man, I must say that the
masses behave stupidly at times.

43.

It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful
of the future.

44.

At times I think I am no good at all.

45.

Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty
lonesome place.

46.

I is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal
or cause that life becomes meaningful.

47.

In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed
in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to
what others are saying.

48.

There is so much to be done and so little time to do
it in.

49.

People say insulting and vulgar things about me.

SO.

The principles I have come to believe in are quite
different from those believed in by most people.

51.

In a discussion I sometimes interrupt others too much
in my eagerness to put across my own point of view.
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52.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends
whose tastes and beliefs are the same
and associates "<,;
as one 0 s ovm.

53.

There are a number of people I have come to hate
because of things they stand for.

54.

In this complicated world of ours the only way we can
know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts
who can be trusted.

55.

There is nothing new under the sun.

56.

It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

57.

Once I get heated up in a heated discussion I just
can't stop.

58.

To achieve the happiness of mankind in the future it
is sometimes necessary to put up with injustices in the
present.

59.

While the use of force is wrong by and large, it
sometimes is the only way possible to advance a
noble ideal.

60.

The main thing in life is for a person to want to do
something important.

61.

In a heated discussion people have a way of bringi_ng up
irrelevant issues rather than sticking to the main
issue.

62.

The worst crime a_ person could commit is to attack
publ:ically the people who believe in the same thing
he does.

63.

Of all the different philosophies which exist in
this world there is probably Qnly one �i1ich is correct.

64.

I sometimes have a tendency to be too critical of the
ideas of others.

65.

A person who thinks primarily of his ovm happiness
is beneath contempt.

66.

To one who really takes the trouble to understand the
world he lives in, its an easy matter to predict future
events.

